Critical Infrastructures are nowadays exposed to new kind of threats. The cause of such threats is related to the large number of new vulnerabilities and architectural weaknesses introduced by the extensive use of ICT and Network technologies into such complex critical systems. In this paper we present the first outcomes of an exhaustive ICT security assessment analysis, having as target a real, well defined, Turbo-Gas based Power Plant.
Introduction
Security threats are one of the main problems of this computer-based era. All systems making use of information and communication technologies (ICT) are prone to failures and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious software and agents. Considering the massive use of ICT technologies in the so called "critical infrastructures", it has become imperative to perform proper risk assessments, putting in evidence the main threats a system is exposed to and eventually the effectiveness of the possible countermeasures. There exist in the scientific literature some approaches to the risk assessment of ICT infrastructures [1, 2] . In particular, the methodology presented by Masera and Nai (InSAW) [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] is tailored for analyze under several aspects the impact of ICT threats on Critical Infrastructures. In one of their works [8] Masera et all. present a first practical test of such methodology. In such trial, the authors applied an embryonic version of InSAW in order to analyze the vulnerabilities of a simple, realistic but not actually deployed, remote control station. In this paper we present the first outcomes of an exhaustive ICT security assessment analysis based on InSAW, having as target a real, well defined, Turbo-Gas based Power Plant. Moreover, taking advantage of the results of such analysis, we present a set ICT attack scenarios which we have successfully implemented in a special laboratory environment (developed in collaboration with a main Power Company) which fully reproduce the analyzed Power Plant (networks, production environment, SCADA systems, electro-mechanical devices etc.). The paper is organized as follows: in the next section a high-level system framing of the analyzed Power Plant is presented. In Section 3 and Section 4, according to the InSAW paradigm, the outcomes of the Vulnerability analysis, of the Threat Analysis are described. Section 5 contains the description of the identified Attack scenarios which expose the Power Plant to major risks. In Section 6 the conclusions carried out as result of this case study are presented.
High Level Power Plant Framing
For being analyzed, a complex system has to be framed into functional blocks. In this paper, we have concentrated our attention in the threats deriving from the massive use of ICT technologies in a typical Power Plant architecture. For this reason we have chosen as main discrimination property in the architecture framing, the networking sub-division.
Logical Framing
Figure 1, shows the high-level architecture of the analyzed power plant. From the networking perspective, it is possible to identify some major subsystems:
• Power Plant Backbone: it is composed of all the network devices which allow the different subnet of the Power Plant to communicate. Its principal devices are:
-Layer switches: which manage at low level the traffic between the different branches of the Power Plant Network -Process Firewall: which separates and filters the traffic between the Field Network, the Process Network and the "rest of the world" -Routers: which interconnect the different Power Plants and the different sub-net constituting the Company Intranet -Internet Firewall: it separates the Company Network from Internet.
• Field Network: it is the network interconnecting the sensors and the actuators which directly interact with the Power Plant Electro-Mechanic devices.
• Process Network: this network hosts all the SCADA systems. By using these systems, the Plant Operators manage the whole Power Plant, sending control commands to such sensors in the Field Network and reading Plant Measurements and Parameters.
• DMZ (Demilitarized Zone): this area hosts a set of "data exchange" servers, which receive data from the process network and make them available to the operators which work in the Power Plant Intranet.
• Secondary Regulation Network: it hosts a set of RTU (remote terminal units), which implement the "secondary regulation protocol".
• Power Plant Intranet: this is the branch of the Company network that provides intranet services to the Power Plant Operators. It is used not only in order to conduct "office work", but also to keep remotely under control the Power Plant, by accessing, through a VPN authentication, the DMZ and the Process Network of a target Power Plant.
• Company Intranet: It is the generic Intranet of the Company that operates the Power Plant. It is usually based on a classical Windows domain architecture.
• Internet: this network is the "rest of the world".
• Data Network: this is a high availability network, used to directly interconnect the different power plants operated by the Company, providing services such as DNS, anti-virus automatic updates etc. 
Operational Flows and Dependencies
In the analysis of a complex system, not only the physical and logical components have to be taken into consideration. Another relevant aspect has to be considered: the dependencies among the different sub-systems and components, and the "operational flows" generated by the system and by the interactions with the operators. This paper does not describe in a detailed manner such profiles for the case under analysis for the lack of space. However, in order to understand the attack scenarios we will describe in the next section the most interesting operational flows and behaviors that characterize the activities of a Power Plant.
Field Network Operational Flows
The Field Network hosts all the devices which are directly connected with the Power Plant hardware, e.g. the Gas Turbine, the Steam system etc. Such devices are typically sensors and actuators with a basic logic for the automatic control of the Power Plant in conditions of normal work. There exists a data flow between the Power Plant hardware and such sensors. Usually this flow uses dedicated communication protocols, like for example Mod-Bus and Profi-Bus. On the other hand, such actuators are the front-line of the ICT system controlling the whole Power Plant. For this reason, they must communicate their actions, the measurements they receive from the field, to the higher control level, i.e. the SCADA systems.
Process Network Operational Flows
The Process Network hosts all the systems which constitute what is generally known as SCADA system. This system is usually composed of a set of Servers which keep under control all the Field Network. In other words, they receive data flows from the Field Network, analyze the information received and present to the Process Operator a summary of the actual Power Plant state. The operator, when identifies some anomaly, can use the "Diagnostic systems"", in order to investigate. Such systems exchange data with the SCADA servers in order to identify, if exists, the source of the anomaly. On the basis of the result of such analysis, or due to other reasons, the operator, through the SCADA servers, can generate a commands flow directed to the Field Network, in order to force a modification of the state of the Power Plant.
DMZ Operational Flows
The DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) usually hosts a data exchange Server. This server receives data flows from the SCADA servers, which summarize in a more generic way the state of the Power Plant. Such a server is usually queried by the operators which work in the Intranet of the Power Plant, in order to have a high-level picture of the Plant state, without accessing directly the Process Network. The remote access to this area is usually regulated, as the access to the Process Network, by a properly configured firewall, which operates also a point-to-point VPN (over Radius). In this way, only authorized operators can remotely access the DMZ and the Process Network. On the other hand it is remarkable how the flows between the different servers are not usually authenticated in any way.
Intranet Operational Flows
The Power Plant Intranet is typically a sub-branch of the company Intranet (where "company" means the organization which operates the Power Plant). In our case study the Intranet is based on a Windows Domain, with a strong set of security and access policies. From this area, operators can, after establishing a VPN connection with the Process Firewall, access all the Process Servers and the DMZ servers, in order to perform any required operation. Moreover, from the Intranet, an operator can access the Internet.
Internet Operational Flows
By definition, Internet represents the external world, i.e. everything which is outside of the Company Network. In our study case, however, the public communication channel is used by remote operators in order to connect themselves to the Power Plant, e.g. for maintenance matters. The mechanism used is Radius authentication over a site-to-site VPN network. In this way, a remote operator outside from the Company network is potentially able to appear virtually as an "inside" operator. Moreover, considering the acceptable behaviors for internal operators, data flows from the intranet to the Internet materialize every time an operator "surfs" the Internet. In this case it has to be noted that the Internet access policies are role-dependent: some operators are allowed to directly access Internet, while others have to pass through a set of proxy servers.
Data Network Operational Flows
The Data Network connects all the "Power Plants" process networks in order to allow a fast exchange of data over a private network. Moreover, it provides services like DNS name resolution. There exist then a considerable number of flows between the process network and the data network. Moreover, the data network is used by the operators, in order to send to the RTU network commands related to the production plan and to the Secondary Regulation.
RTU Network Operational Flows
The RTU network receives only data flows from the Data Network, containing information for the power plant production. Moreover, through a dedicated analogical channel, the RTUs communicate directly with the devices of the field network. It has to be remarked here that in the case study, it does not exist any kind of mutual authentication between the RTUs and the field network devices.
According to the Security Assessment Methodology we have adopted in our study case [3] , in order to identify possible attack scenarios, it is required to first identify all the relevant vulnerabilities which affect the system under analysis. In our analysis, we identified several vulnerabilities, classified in different classes:
• Architectural vulnerabilities: these vulnerabilities directly derive from weaknesses of the network architecture adopted. Examples of this kind of vulnerabilities are:
-The weak separation between the Process Network and the Field Network (every kind of traffic between the two networks is allowed)
-The lack of authentication between the active components of the Power Plant (e.g. actuators-SCADA Servers, actuators-RTUs, RTUsCentral Production plan System, SCADA-Data exchange Servers)
-The single point of failure represented by the Process Firewall
• Security Policy Vulnerabilities: the set of security policies adopted is weak, especially in relation with remote users which can authenticate themselves to the Intranet (lack of specifications related to the properties the remote PC should guarantee -e.g. antivirus etc.). Moreover traceability and access policies are weak and not sufficiently clear.
• Software Vulnerabilities: we conducted an extensive analysis of the known vulnerabilities of the software components of the system under analysis. At the end of our survey we identified 240 different software vulnerabilities affecting the PCs, the Servers, the switches and the routers used in the analyzed infrastructure. Of these 240 vulnerabilities, at least 100 could be used in order to take partial or complete control of the target machine. Moreover at least 70 were able, if exploited, to block the respective affected machine.
Obviously, the presented scenario is not as dramatic as it could seem. In fact, few of the identified vulnerabilities can be easily exploited in order to perform complex malicious actions against the analyzed Power Plant. Nevertheless, their presence highlights how the intensive use of ICT technology has greatly increased the number of possible "failure" scenarios.
Threat Analysis
In this phase, the potential threats are identified, starting from a list of typical hazards. Then, those potentially more effective are considered. Finally, the results are synthesized computing exposure indexes and profile. These operations can be grouped into three main sub-phases:
• Threat Hypothesis: The types of threats to be considered are characterised in a first stage according to the following attributes: Type (internal/external), Agent (person/object), Motivation (intentional, accidental etc.), Expertise and Resources (needed to perform the threat), Perceived Value Asset, Plausibility and Severity.
• Threat Verification: The threats identified are screened according to the risks they might pose to the system.
• Threat Value: For each selected threat the Plausibility and the Severity are qualitatively estimated.
We define here the Plausibility of a threat as the likelihood of the existence of the menace targeting a certain vulnerability for provoking a damage to the system. The Severity of a threat can be, at the same way, defined as the capacity to produce damage by the violation of some vulnerability, as observed at the level of the high-level services supplied by the overall system.
Threats
There is no generally accepted definition of threat. From the legal point of view, a threat by an agent consists of the unwanted (deliberate or accidental) expression of intent to execute action that may result in harm to an asset. Therefore, a threat is the potential occurrence of a negative action, not its actual realization. The following classification is based on a generic list of threat agents that might jeopardise critical infrastructures [9] :
• Crackers, Malicious hackers, Script-Kiddies:All these figures refer to individuals with certain knowledge of computer and communication systems, which break into systems violating security measures. They sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in their community.
• Insider threat:The disgruntled organization insider is a principal source of computer crime. Insiders may not need a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions, because their knowledge of a victim system often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system data.
• Malware Writers:Malicious code writers produce software designed specifically to damage or disrupt systems, such as a virus, a worm or a Trojan horse. These are normally known as malware. They can be specific (target to particular systems or even organisations), or generic.
• Criminal Groups: There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by criminal groups who attack systems, mainly for monetary gain. These groups might try to get internal information for blackmailing the company, or to extort by menacing the dissemination of some sensible information, or to commit different types of fraud (e.g. influencing some prices), or forgery (e.g. changing values in bills).
• Hacktivists: Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on publicly accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. These groups and individuals overload e-mail servers and hack into Web sites to send a political message. Their activity against infrastructures can be motivated by environmental, safety, or nationalistic reasons -but this is hardly related to the targeted systems.
• Terrorist Groups: Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives Behind the plausibility and severity values we have assigned to such threats, there is a set of motivations derived from the analysis of the system under attack and from interviews conducted with the operators and the managers of the Power Plant. For example, in a normal condition, the severity impact of an insider threat (e.g. a disgruntled employee) could be very high if such user has direct access to the process network and to the SCADA systems. On the other hand, even if the plausibility of a malware infection can be considered high (once the attacker is able to convince an internal user to run the virus), the impact of such threat on the "core" of the power plant (i.e. the field network) can be considered at the moment low, since the systems used in such area are less vulnerable to traditional viruses, ( they run dedicated services, using proprietary protocols etc.) and in any case it is always possible to bypass such systems in order to control manually the Power Plant. Obviously if we consider advanced viruses, properly tailored for target attacks on such dedicated system, the evaluation scenario has to be modified. In the same way, the severity impact of a cracking activity must be considered high since hypothetically the hacker can be able to obtain the control of critical systems. The same consideration can be done in the case of "Organized Groups".
Attack Scenarios
This section presents a high-level description of the attack scenarios we identified and successfully implemented during our case study analysis. The purpose is to give an idea of the level of exposition to which a typical Power Plant is nowadays subject.
Radius Server Denial of Service
DOS attacks have the scope of causing damage by drastically limiting, or even denying, access to specific resources, thus making them unusable to intended users. In this scenario an attacker tries to consume the bandwidth resources of the Radius Server which is exposed to the Internet. The first step of any attack process is to collect information about the target system. This step is known as System Fingerprinting. Since the system is interconnected with Internet, usually it is possible to guess information about the system analyzing the results of network scans, ICMP packet content, banners, and several other network discovery techniques. The second source of information, people, is extremely vulnerable. By the use of procedures known as Social Engineering Techniques, it is possible to obtain relevant information about the target system. Per se, the bandwidth consumption is a very simple task: an attacker needs to generate a sufficient amount of traffic directed to the target server, in order to keep occupied all its resources. For fulfilling such objective the attacker needs to command a sufficient amount of machines connected to the target network and able to generate such traffic. In the proposed attack scenario, the control of extra computer power is done by the use of a dedicated Trojan horse, which spreads itself on the Internet infecting as many machines as possible and installing a backdoor in the compromised machines. By the use of the backdoor, the attacker becomes the real owner of the machine and is then able to create and configure a "Distributed DOS Zombie network". Combining then the power of this network with the information obtained in the fingerprinting phase, the attacker is then able to run the process and block completely the external access to the company Intranet and then, indirectly, the external access to the Power Plant Network.
Intranet Virus Infection
This scenario, based on Virus Infection, presents an attack with two main goals:
• To gain control of a PC in the corporate Intranet in order to impersonate a legitimate user.
• To use the infected PC to perform malicious actions on the critical plant networks, such as DoS on the process firewall, DoS on the Data Exchange server or damage to Diagnostic and SCADA systems Viral infections can attack all environments connected to an open network. Anti Virus software is the most important instrument against viral infection. However, even a fully patched system with an updated anti-virus may be vulnerable to virus attacks in the interval between the release of the virus code, and the moment the Anti Virus vendors provide a new updated virus definition package. In this scenario, the attacker uses viruses to gain control of an Intranet PC and to damage vital parts of the system such as servers on the Diagnostic and SCADA subnets. The first step of any attack process is to collect information about the target system. This step, as already explained, is known as System Fingerprinting. In order to be able to conduct a dangerous virus attack on the system with a good chance of success, the attacker must have enough knowledge about security and programming skills allowing him to write a new virus tailored to the target system. At this point, there are two possibilities:
1. The virus exploits existing vulnerabilities on the target PC: in this case, the attacker can directly launch the virus against it (of course the attacker needs to be able to reach in some way the target PC. If the Attacker is an Insider, it could be, obviously an easy task. On the other hand, if the attacker is external two are the possibilities: (a) the vulnerability chosen is related to a service which has an open port on the firewall (b) Social Engineering.).
2. The virus code must be run on the target PC: in this case, the attacker has to convince the PC user to run the virus code. The goal can be reached using social engineering techniques.
In both cases, if the virus code is run, the Intranet PC becomes infected and gets compromised. If the virus has been designed with a backdoor inside, the attacker can gain control of the PC and then can impersonate a legitimate user, performing every type of action for which the original user was authorized (and even the illegal actions that the real user can execute, allowed by deficient security policies). It is relevant to note, that even in this case, if the attacker is an Insider, the remote control of the machine is easy to maintain. If, conversely, the attacker is external, the communication channel over which the backdoor is used must pass through the firewall. This could be obviously an obstacle to the attack; but it can be circumvented by inserting automatic procedures into the virus. In this way, the virus can perform the requested offensive actions by itself, without requiring any remote control. This sort of attacks can be used to cause damage to the Data Exchange Server or to the SCADA servers. Moreover, the attacker could steal user login information (user name and password), or cause a DoS on the PI or on the power plant firewall. It is important to remark that we have chosen to position that attack in the Intranet environment. Nevertheless, the same scenario can take place in the Data Network, in the DMZ and in the Process Network. In the same way, if the "source of Infection" is located in the Data Network, connecting all the Power Plants, it is possible, for example, to conduct remote DoS against the RTU Network, blocking in this way the Secondary Regulation Process.
Phishing Attacks
In this scenario two are the main goals an attacker hopes to reach: (a) He tries to steal the credentials of an authorized user (in order to be able to perpetrate damage to the Power Plant Network) (b) He tries to provide to the user false information about the Power Plant. Phishing attacks are typically mounted in one of the following ways: by means of a faked e-mail, displaying a link which seems to point to a legitimate site, but actually linking to a malicious website; or, by poisoning the victim's DNS server, thus making it possible to transparently connect to the malicious server. In our particular scenario, the attacker needs to replicate at least some part of the system interfaces and infrastructure, i.e. a little fake domain and, for example a Data Exchange server for the data distribution. Information about the structure to be replicated can be obtained by the attacker using the already presented techniques of system fingerprinting.
Once the attacker has replicated the infrastructure, by system fingerprint techniques, he collects information on the systems and on the user which he wants to damage. Moreover, he needs to collect information about the DNS used by such user. Once he is in possession of such information, he can make a DNS poisoning in order to re-route the connection of the user to the fake site. In this way, the next time the victim tries to connect himself to the Data Exchange server, not only he will be transparently re-routed to the fake server, which will provide false information about the state of the Power Plant, but it will be also possible to capture the victim credentials used to log into the Data Exchange Server.
Conclusions
As discussed in the previous sections, the world of Critical Infrastructures is far to be considered safe and secure from the ICT perspective. The large number of vulnerabilities identified in this case study (we remind here that the Power Plant analyzed is real, active and in production) demonstrates how much the ICT security in such context is nowadays considered a negligible argument. The implementation of the attacks in our research laboratory (which reproduces all the aspects of the analyzed Power Plant (network, applications, policies, SCADA systems, electro-mechanical devices etc.)) have demonstrated that ICT attack scenarios are feasible and constitute a reality which cannot be ignored anymore. The effects and the damages hypothetically caused by an attacker successfully implementing such scenarios can be extremely severe, even with impacts on society at large. This situation requires appropriate solutions, which can only be developed with the use of adequate analytic tools. The use of the InSAW approach in the analysis process has allowed the systematic identification of the implicit failure-prone relationships among the different sub-system analyzed, highlighting potential cascading effects and other possible attack scenarios and point of weakness. Correspondingly, the use of our Malware Simulation Framework [10] has enabled us to properly forged virus that can produce dramatic impacts on the security and safety of a typical power plant. The results presented in this paper constitute the first step of a more deep campaign of systematic studies related to the impact of ICT vulnerabilities on industrial and critical systems. For the future we plan to study more in detail the vulnerabilities of the SCADA systems communication protocols and architectures. This will permit to better define the needed security policies and countermeasures.
